FCRnX Rm X R where it is assumed that R XR X{T}CF and T < co. At each time t player I selects a control u(t)€U based upon his observations of the trajectory of II up to time t in such a way as to maximize the payoff; conversely at each time t player II selects a control v(t)eV based upon his observations of x(t), 0 < t < t, in such a way as to minimize the payoff. Games with payoff of the first kind have been called games of prescribed duration [ 1] , while games with payoff of the second kind have been called pursuit-evasion games {player I is the evader, II is the pursuer). Now it is difficult to make precise the notion of a strategy for the players which takes into account the information available to them at each instant of time. In this paper we
shall propose a precise definition of a strategy (which agrees with our intuition) and we justify it by demonstrating the existence of a saddle point. Our definition is an extension of that given in [2] in a direction suggested by Roxin [ 3] .
Whereas the technique that we use to prove the saddle-point theorems (Theorems 7, 8, 9 ) is borrowed to a large extend from Fleming [4 ] , the spirit of this paper is closer to the approach of Ryll-Nardzewski [ 5] .
In the next section we state standard assumptions on the systems (1) and (2) which guarantee compactness of the space of trajectories of the two players. In Section 3 we define classes of strategies with differing information patterns and prove an important (although easy) result which allows us to compare these different classes of strategies. In Section 4 we use this result to give a very simple proof of Fleming's theorem for a payoff of the first kind, namely we show that the optimal payoff for the majorant and minorant games (see [4] ) converge to the same limit V as the discrepancy in the information patterns vanishes. In Section 5
we propose our definition of the game and show existence of saddle -points for a payoff of the first kind (Theorem 7). The value of the game agrees with that of Fleming. As a corollary to this result in Section we obtain existence of saddle-point for payoffs of the second kind. In Section 7 we give one example which seems to show that our definition cannot be made more attractive.
2. Conditions on the differential systems. We make the following assumptions on the differential systems (1). Corresponding assumptions are made (but not stated) regarding (2).
(i) For each fixed t, f is continuous in (x, u) for all (x, u)eR X U
(ii) There is a measurable function k, integrable on finite intervals, such that for every ueU and x, x in R , |f(x,u,t) -f(x,u,t)| < k(t)|x-x| A measurable function u(v) is said to be an admissible control if u(t)€U(v(t)eV) for all t. A solution x of (1) (y of (2)) is said to be an admissible trajectory if it arises from an admissible control.
Definition: Let X (x ) denote the set of all admissible trajectories x of Similarly Y (y ) is a subset of C . The next result is well-known (see for example [6] or [7] ); the first part is a consequence of the assumption that the sets f(x, U,t) and g(y,V,t) are convex whereas the second part follows from the assumption that f, g are Lipschitz. be the solution of (1) corresponding to the control u where ue(t) = urt 3. Strategies. Let x ,y be specified initial states. Throughout this (ii) A6(x ,y ) is the set of all functions a : YT(yQ) -XT(XQ) such that if y, y are in Y (y ) with y(-r) = y(T) for 0 < t < i6T then a y(-r) = a y(T) 1 for 0 < t < i6T; i = 0,1,... , -.
(iii) A(x ,y ) is the set of all functions a: YT(yQ)^XT<XQ) such that if y,y are in Y_(y ) with y(T) = y(T) for 0 < t < t then^(t) = ay(T) for 0 < t < t; 0 < t < T .
The sets of strategies B6(xQ,y0), B(xQ,y0) and B (xQ, yQ) are defined in the same way.
It is convenient to regard the strategies for I as subsets of characterization which is closer to that of Fleming [4] V6 (x ,y ) = Min Max Min Max y^Y^x^X^) y2€Y2(y1(6T)) x** X^x^T))
where, X1 (x ) (Y (y )) is the set of all admissible trajectories x (y ) of (1) ( (2) and starting at time i6T in the state xX(i6T) (y1(i6T)) . The outcome (x,y) is defined by x(t) =x(t) (y(t) =yX(t)), (i-l)6T < t < i6T, i =l,2,..., 
flr6cA6(x0,y0) P6«B6(x0,y0)
W W x£Xt<V
VWV y,YT(y0) Sketch of Proof: We shall prove (5) and (7). A proof of (5) whenever ||x-x|| < £*, ||y-y|| < £*; x,x«X ; y, yeY . Let 6* > 0 be such that for all 6 < 6*, £(6) < £* where £ (6) is the function defined in Theorem 4 (ii). Now let 6 < 6*, (x ,y )cX X Y be fixed.
Let a eA (x.,yrt) be such that opt x 0 J0 V5(-0.y0) £H^(%pt.P6). yCjpfPfi)) tor all P6£B6(x0,y0)
The existence Of a^follows from (5). Let a e = II r • a . Then opt -6 6 opt 6 6 a_ €A (x , y ) by Theorem 4 (i). Let |3 e B (x , y ) be arbitrary and suppose that x€XT(xQ), y€YT(yQ) are such that
£.6(y) =x , P (x) =y
Let x=a* t(y), and let g.6 =P°n6 ' Then x=H6 (x) and 2-6 tB6
and furthermore,
«08pt(y) =«. £.8(*) =y
It follows from (10) that V5(x0,y0) < u(x,y)
But ||x-x|| = |K(x) -x|| < £(6) < £*, so that by (9) V *xo,yo* -^x,y^+Ŝ ince a c eA. and since |3 €B is arbitrary it follows that -6 6 V6(x,y)<r|+ Max Min u(x(<*6, (3 ),y^, P )) <v<=Ac (36<=B6 In this section we propose a direct definition of a game. Our definition is in some sense a limit of the games G , G_ as 6 goes to zero. However our formulation is much closer to that of Ryll-Nardzewski [ 5] .
As before let x ,y be specified initial states. Player I choose a strategy a«A(x ,y ), player II chooses a strategy (3cB(x ,y ). It would be natural to define the outcome of such choice to be any pair x€X (x ), y€YT(yo) such that Let 0(0-, (3) = {(x, y)|(x, y) is an outcome of (or, P)}. n wn 'n n J n-^-co n-*-co n-^co n-^co lim (xn,P(xn)) = (x,y) n-*"00
It follows that u (P) < Sup (x, p(x)) .
X€XT(X())
Lemma 4. u (p) is a lower semicontinuous function of (3eB(x , y ) \x_{&) is an upper semicontinuous function of o-eA(x ,y ).
Proof: We shall only prove the first half of the assertion since the proof for the second half is analogous. Let z be a real number and let Bz = {p|P6B(x0,y0), u+(P) < z}
We must show that B is closed. Let (P(k)} be a net in B converging to (3 in B, i.e., for each x £X (x ) lim p(k)x = P(x) . Let x 6X (x ) . We can now define the fair game and prove the existence of a saddle point. The game G is defined as follows: Player I selects a strategy areA(x, y) whilst II independently selects a (3cB(x, y) . The payoff is given by u(x, y) where (x, y) is an arbitrarily chosen pair from 0(ar, P). The saddle-point theorem shows that the value is independent of the arbitrary choice of the outcome.
Theorem 7. (Saddle-Point Theorem) There exists a**A(x ,y ), p*€B(x0,y0) such that for all aeA(xQtyQ) and all p€B(xQ,y0),
Min u(x, y) < Min u(x, y) (x, y) € 0(<**, P*) (x, y) € 0(<**, P)
Furthermore u(x, y) =^F{^Q>Y0) for all (x, y) e0(a*, p*).
Proof: By the definition of u , u we see that Max H-(x,y) < u (P*), u (or*) < Min u(x, y) (x,y)€0(a,p*) " (x,y)€0(a*,P)
The result now follows from the previous Corollary.
Definition. Given two players I and II with dynamics (1) and (2) 
We now define the game: There is given a closed set F C R XR X[0,co) and a T < oo such that (x, y, T ) e F for all (x, y) €Rn X Rm . The t(x,y) < V_(x0,yQ) + € i. e. , there is a t < T = V (x , y ) + e such that (x(t),y(t),t)eF .
Now define the continuous function u on the set X (x ) x YT (yQ) acA(x0,y0) (x,y)€ 0(or, P*) atAfr^yJ (x,y) €0 (or, p) for all P«B(x ,y )i, e there exists an optimal pursuit strategy.
Proof: Consider the game defined on the fixed time interval [0,T*] with the continuous payoff function H-rp^Clearly V_(u ; x , y ) = 0
and so there exists a strategy p* such that for all areA(x ,y ) and all (x, y)€0(<*, p*), HT;!j(x,y) = 0; this implies that t(x, y) < T*. Q.E.D.
Unfortunately, trivial examples show that in general there does not exist a strategy <*#eA(x , y ) such that
PeB(x0,y0) (x,y)£0(a*,p)
We can therefore only assert the following theorem.
Theorem 10. If there is a strategy or*cA(x ,y ) which is optimal for player I (i.e. , satisfies (15)) then the pair (<**, p*) from a saddle point i.e. , for all or€A(x0,y0), p€B(X(),y0), Sup t(x,y) < Sup t(x,y) = T* = Inf t(x, y) (x,y) € 0(<*, p*) (x, y) € 0(a*, P*) (x, y) 6 0(<**, P*) < Inf t(x, y) (x,y)€0(a*,P)
Various conditions can be placed on the set of trajectories and the endzone F which guarantee existence of an optimal evasion strategy a But then by condition (C) T(a(k)) < z -e + y(n) where lim y(r\) = 0.
It follows that for all sufficiently large k, T(<*(k)) < z which is a con tradiction. Hence A is closed and so T(a) is upper semicontinuous. 
